Wednesday, 03 March 2010

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EXPLANATION OF HOW WE HAVE COME TO THIS CRISIS In 2001 produced the burst of the tech bubble, it causes the U.S. Federal Reserve down in just two years, the cost of borrowing of 6.5 1 , thereby having a doping of the housing market begins to take off like beasts. In 10 years the real price of housing is multiplied by two in the U.S.. These exceptionally low interest rates continued for years, which caused banks saw that the business is increasingly made them smaller, then gave a low-interest loans. Thus the decreased net interest income, not offset by the commissions, so they thought they should make more risky loans by charging more interest and increase the number of operations for the small margin multiplied by a large number of operations to become a beautiful figure of profits. To do this, building the housing boom, decided to offer mortgages at a rate of customers called "ninja" (no income, no job, no assets, that is, people without steady income, without fixed employment without property) by charging more interest on the greatest risk he assumed the bank. Moreover, full of enthusiasm, decided to grant mortgage loans worth more than the value of the house that he bought the ninja, because, in the aforementioned housing boom, the house in a few months, would be worth more than the amount given on loan. This type of mortgage, they were called "subprime". They are called "prime mortgages" which have little risk of default. Moreover, as the U.S. economy was going great, the insolvent debtor could find a job today and pay the debt without problems. This approach was well for some years.In those years, buyers were paying the mortgage installments and also as they had been given more money than their house was worth, had bought a car, had been renovating the house...
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Background By 1997, Asia attracted almost half of all affluent capital to developing countries. In particular, the economies of Southeast Asia maintained high interest rates that attracted foreign investors seeking high returns. As a result, the economies of the region received a major tributary of money and experienced a dramatic increase in asset prices. At the same time, regional economies of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea experienced high growth rates, from 8 to 12 of GDP in the late 1980s and early 90s. This achievement was widely held by financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and was known as part of the "Asian economic miracle."In 1994, economist Paul Krugman published an article attacking the idea of an "Asian economic miracle." argued that economic growth in Southeast Asia had been the historical result of capital investment, which had led to growth productivity, but the total factor productivity had increased only marginally or not at all. Krugman argued that only the total factor productivity and not capital investment, could lead to long-term prosperity. The causes of the debacle are many and disputed. Thailand's economy is in a bubble filled with hot money. It required more and more while growing the size of the bubble.The same situation prevailed in Malaysia but in this case had better political leadership, and Indonesia, which had the added complication of what was called "savage capitalism." The flow of short-term capital was expensive and often highly conditioned by rapid economic benefit. The money ended up in an uncontrolled manner to certain people only, not particularly the most appropriate or most efficient, but those closest to the centers of power. In the mid-1990s, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea South had large private current account deficits and maintaining a fixed exchange rate incentives for external borrowing...